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Abstract
We study the evolution of preferences via payo¤ monotonic dynamics in strategic environ-
ments with and without complete information. It is shown that, with complete information and
subgroup matching, empirically plausible interdependent preference relations may entail the lo-
cal instability of individualistic preferences (which target directly the maximization of material
payo¤s/…tness). The said instability may even be global if the subgroup size is large enough.
In contrast, under incomplete information (unobservability of preference types), we show that
independent preferences are globally stable in a large set of environments, and locally stable in
essentially any standard environment, provided that the number of subgroups that form in the
society is large. Since these results are obtained within the context of a very general model, they
may be thought of as providing an evolutionary rationale for the prevalence of individualistic
preferences.
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11 Introduction
Traditional economic analysis takes the individual preferences as an exogenous datum and does
not consider their particular form as a relevant object of study. Moreover, there appears to be a
consensus in the …eld about which type of preferences to allow in economic models. The working
assumption of a vast majority of economists on this regard is that an individual’s behavior is guided
by the sole motive of the maximization of one’s own material payo¤s. However, this assumption has
recently come under severe criticism in light of the evidence obtained from numerous experiments
that involve strategic situations. In turn, this has led many economists to consider alternative (non-
individualistic) preference structures that yield predictions which accord better with the experimental
regularities.1 It appears that time has come to critically examine the validity of exclusively modeling
one’s preferences as “individualistic” (i.e. independent of others’ payo¤s), and to ask deeper questions
about the basis and plausibility of alternative preference structures.
One natural approach to addressing this issue is to adopt an evolutionary perspective and ask
the following question: What type of preferences are evolutionarily stable, in the sense of inducing
material payo¤s at least as high as any alternative “mutant” in any given environment? If one
subscribes to the widely held view that
(i) success (reproductive or otherwise) is an increasing function of material payo¤s, and
(ii) individual preferences are inherited either by genetic transmission and/or imitation,
any clear-cut answer to this question will provide a useful “evolutionary rationalization” of certain
preference structures (at least in some environments). This is precisely the approach adopted here.2
Since the goals of agents with individualistic preferences may be conceived identical to those
of natural selection (i.e. the maximization of material resources), the evolutionary approach has
been often used in economics to justify the assumption of material payo¤ maximization (cf. Fried-
man, 1953). However, it turns out that this line of argument is not true without some non-trivial
quali…cations, for it is possible that non-individualistic preferences are materially more rewarding
than individualistic preferences in certain strategic environments. For instance, if the dynamics of
1See, among others, Bolton and Ockenfels (1998), Fehr and Schmidt (1998) and Levine (1998).
2An alternative (and by all means complementary) approach would be to model the formation of preferences via
positing that preferences are transmitted through generations by means of the socialization actions of the parents.
While mostly prominent in the …eld of cultural anthropology, this cultural evolutionary approach has received some
attention from economists as well. For instance, the recent work by Bisin and Verdier (1998, 1999) focus on the
implications of modeling the intergenerational transmission of cultural traits (and, in particular, preferences) as a
result of the deliberate inculcation attempts of rational parents who evaluate the ex ante well-being of their children
by using their own preferences. We refer the reader to Selten (1991) for a lively comparison of the genetic and cultural
approaches.
2evolution takes place through pairwise random matching and/or local interaction, then altruistic
preferences may well be evolutionarily stable (Fershtman and Weiss, 1998, Bester and Güth, 1998,
and Eshel et al., 1998). In a similar vein, Koçkesen et al. (1998, 1999) show that if all agents interact
with every other agent simultaneously, then negatively interdependent (spiteful) preferences have a
sharp evolutionary edge against individualistic (sel…sh) preferences in a large class of strategic models
(that contain, for instance, the common pool resource and public good games). The evolutionary
case for individualistic preferences is thus not at all straightforward.
In this paper, we aim to lay out an evolutionary foundation for individualistic preferences. We
shall argue that the conclusions reached by the above cited studies depend crucially on the implicit
assumption that preferences are common knowledge (i.e. the underlying game is one of complete in-
formation). Intuitively, under complete information, non-individualistic preferences serve as credible
commitment devices, and hence it is not surprising that they may prove pro…table in terms of the
intrinsic (material) payo¤s of a given game. However, under incomplete information (more precisely,
under unobservability of preferences), they loose credibility, and as we intend to show, they may
consequently be dominated by individualistic preferences in almost any environment.
To be more precise, consider a …nite population in which each individual has either individual-
istic or an arbitrarily …xed type of non-individualistic preferences. Suppose as well that agents are
randomly matched in subgroups to play a given symmetric game in strategic form, and assume that
the two types of preferences under consideration have di¤erent equilibrium implications in this game
(so that they are behaviorally distinguishable). Loosely stated, the question that we ask is this: How
do the (expected) material payo¤s of the individualistic and non-individualistic agents compare in
equilibrium at various population compositions? As might be expected, it turns out that the answer
depends crucially on the following two considerations: (i) the extent of information agents have on
the “type” of their opponents; (ii) the number of subgroups in the society.
In what follows, we …rst take up the complete information scenario in which we assume that
the types of each individual are perfectly observable. Building upon the earlier results of Koçkesen
et al. (1999), we show that, in a variety of economic environments, individualistic preferences are
locally unstable. Put more concretely, we provide examples of classes of games in which “spiteful”
agents obtain more material payo¤s than material-payo¤ maximizing individualistic agents in any
equilibrium, at least when the former represent a small fraction of the whole population. We also
show that, depending on the particulars of the environment, individualistic preferences may even be
dominated globally, i.e. irrespectively of the frequencies of each type in the population.
Our main concern in this paper is, however, to understand the arguably more realistic scenario
in which individuals do not observe their opponents’ preferences but they are only informed of the
3overall population frequencies. In such an incomplete-information setup, the relative magnitudes of
the population and subgroup sizes become important since they determine the e¤ective uncertainty
experienced by any player in predicting her opponents’ types. Thus, if the subgroups are relatively
large (and the e¤ective matching uncertainty is therefore small), the conclusions obtained under
perfect observability are recovered, i.e. interdependent preferences prevail in a wide class of economic
environments. On the other hand, if the subgroups are relatively small compared to the population,
matching uncertainty does have “bite,” and in this case, we reach to a very di¤erent conclusion:
only individualistic preferences can survive in the long run under any material payo¤-responsive
evolutionary process. We view this result as a benchmark that provides a rigorous evolutionary
rationale for individualistic preferences. It is worth stressing that, in contrast with the earlier results
obtained in the literature, this observation remains valid in any game that satis…es certain standard
convexity and continuity conditions, and what is more, it applies “globally” within a very large class
of environments.3
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce a general model in which the stability
of individualistic preferences is analyzed under the hypothesis of perfect observability of types. In this
section we provide a number of examples that demonstrate how easily can individualistic preferences
be “beaten” by others in their own turf (i.e. in terms of material payo¤s). In Section 3, we prove
two general limit results which establish the evolutionary superiority of individualistic preferences
under the hypothesis of imperfect observability of types. A number of caveats and suggestions for
future work are contained in the concluding Section 4.
2 Stability of Individualism under Complete Information
In this section we shall introduce an evolutionary framework in which one can study the stability
properties of di¤erent types of preference structures, in particular, the stability of interdependent
preferences. Our aim is to demonstrate that there is no reason to view such preferences as evolu-
tionarily stable, provided that evolutionary dynamics takes place in a setting in which all individuals
observe perfectly the types of every other agent.
By a pre-environment, we mean a 4-tuple ¡ ´ (n;k;X;¼), where
(i) n 2 f2;3;:::g;
3A local version of this result is obtained by Dekel et al. (1998) who work with …nite games and continuum
populations (see also Ely and Y¬lankaya, 1997, and Güth and Peleg, 1997). While the main emphasis of Dekel et
al. (1998) is not on the evolution of preferences per se but rather on the implications of this notion for prevailing
behavior, there are some similarities between the results obtained by these authors and those reported here. We shall
thus elaborate on the relation between each of them in the sequel (cf. Remark 4 in Section 3).
4(ii) k 2 f2;:::;ng is a divisor of n;
(iii) X is any nonempty set,
(iv) ¼ : Xk ! R is any function.
We view N ´ f1;:::;ng as a population of n individuals which is randomly matched into n=k many
subgroups of size k: So if k = 2; we talk of a pairwise random matching environment, and if k = n, we
talk of a playing the …eld environment. Once the matching takes place, the players of each subgroup
fi1;:::;ikg play a k-person game in which ¼(xi`;x¡i`) stands for the material payo¤s that the player
i` obtains at the action pro…le x: The function ¼ is thus thought of as measuring the access of an
individual to resources that may enhance reproduction. Alternatively, one may think of ¼(xi`;x¡i`)
as a direct measure of the …tness of player i` at x:
We refer to an individual who targets solely the maximization of her material payo¤s as an
individualistic (or independent, or materialist) player. A player j 2 fi1;:::;ikg; however, need not
view the mapping x 7! ¼(xj;x¡j) as her actual objective function. Instead, we posit that the payo¤
function of j may be represented by means of an alternative mapping x 7! ½(xj;x¡j), in which case
we say that j is a non-individualistic player.
Consequently, we de…ne an environment as a 2-tuple E = (¡;½); where ¡ is a pre-environment,
and ½ : Xk ! R is any function. Since a stability analysis is meaningful only in the case of polymor-
phic populations, we de…ne a population composition as a vector of types t = (t1;:::;tn) 2 f¼;½gn
such that t1 = ¼ and tn = ½: Thus, by de…nition, a population composition contains at least one
individualistic and one non-individualistic agent. Our convention is to let individual 1 possess indi-
vidualistic preferences while keeping individual n non-individualistic. Given our symmetric setting,
this convention is without loss of generality.
Given an environment E and a population composition t; the players of each subgroup fi1;:::;ikg





¼(xj;x¡j); if tj = ¼
½(xj;x¡j); if tj = ½
(1)
for all x 2 Xk and j = i1;:::;ik: Notice that if tj = ¼ for all j; then this game is a symmetric game
played by individualistic players who maximize their material payo¤s. The set of all pure-strategy
Nash equilibria of Gfi1;:::;ikg(t) is denoted by N(Gfi1;:::;ikg(t)):
Let A denote the k-element subsets of f1;:::;ng; and de…ne
A¼ ´ fA 2 A : 1 2 Ag and A½ ´ fA 2 A : n 2 Ag: (2)
We next de…ne the following set of equilibrium outcome vectors:
Nk(t) ´ f(xA)A2A : xA 2 N(GA(t))g:
5A vector (xA) 2 Nk(t) simply speci…es an equilibrium outcome in every possible game played by










provided that the members of each subgroup A 2 A¼ (that contains at least one individualistic
player) coordinate on the equilibrium xA when playing GA(t): Similarly, conditional on an equilibrium









for any population composition t.
We are now ready to state the following two stability concepts, both of which are rooted in the
widely used material-payo¤ monotonicity property.
De…nition 1. Let E = (¡;½) be any environment. The individualistic preferences are said to be
locally unstable in E; if
©¼(¼;:::;¼;½;(xA)) < ©½(¼;:::;¼;½;(xA)) for all (xA) 2 Nk(¼;:::;¼;½):
We say that individualistic preferences are exterminated by ½; if
©¼(t;(xA)) < ©½(t;(xA))
for all (xA) 2 Nk(t) and all population compositions t:
In words, we say that individualistic preferences are locally unstable in E if a “mutant” non-
individualistic agent obtains a higher material payo¤ than the average material payo¤ of the indi-
vidualistic agents across all matching contingencies and for any equilibrium. The intuition behind
this de…nition is that mutations are so rare that they occur in only a single individual at a time and
that the number of o¤spring that each parent leaves behind is an increasing function of the material
payo¤s she earns through her adulthood. Thus, material payo¤s (or more directly, …tness) can be
considered as the “currency” of natural selection. The type that is on average more successful in
terms of this currency is regarded more highly by the forces of evolution. It is then natural to focus
on individualistic preferences in the theory of preference evolution, for the owners of such preferences
are unique in that they measure success in terms of the “right” evolutionary currency.
Yet it is not di¢cult to see that individualistic preferences are locally unstable in a vast plethora
of environments. In fact, in essentially any environment with pairwise random matching, there exists
6an alternative preference relation that would yield a higher expected material payo¤ to its owner
relative to individualistic preferences. This elementary fact is formalized in the next example.
Example 1. Consider any environment ¡ ´ (n;2;X;¼) (with pairwise random matching) such
that the 2-person symmetric game (fX;ujgj=1;2); where uj(x) = ¼(xj;x¡j); x 2 X2; has …nitely
many pure strategy equilibria.4 Denote the highest material payo¤ that a player may receive in
equilibrium of this game by u¤: For simplicity, assume next that the best response map B : X ! X
of player 1 is single-valued: fB(b)g = argmaxa2X ¼(a;b) for each b 2 X: Clearly, we have
¼(a;B(a)) ¸ u¤ for some a 2 X: (5)
In what follows, we postulate that ¼ has the following additional property:
¼(a;B(a)) > u¤ for some a 2 X: (6)
We therefore restrict our attention to games in which a Stackelberg leader (in our case player 2)
bene…ts strictly from being a …rst-mover in terms of material payo¤s.5





1; if a 2 argmaxc2X ¼(c;B(c))
0; otherwise,











¼(B(a¤);a¤) and ©½(¼;:::;¼;½;(xA)) = ¼(a¤;B(a¤))
for some a¤ 2 X with ¼(a¤;B(a¤)) > u¤: It readily follows that individualistic preferences are locally
unstable in E:6 ¥
There is a sense in which Example 1 is not convincing, however. Indeed, the non-individualistic
preference relation considered in this example is completely game speci…c, and is clearly “tailored” to
do materially better than the individualistic preferences in the equilibrium of 2-person games. In the
context of preference evolution, it may not be suitable to focus on all preferences that are de…ned on
the action space X; for such preferences may be meaningless in a variety of environments with action
4More generally, we may assume that the set of equilibrium payo¤s of this game is compact.
5This is of course a very mild requirement, and there is a sense in which it holds generically. In particular, this
requirement disallows environments such as those with constant ¼:
6Notice that, by virtue of (??), ©½(¼;:::;¼;½) ¸ ©¼(¼;:::;¼;½) holds even if the pre-environment does not satisfy
(??). Thus, we may say that independent preferences fail to be locally stable in essentially any environment, while
they may be stable in the sense of Liapunov in some environments.
7spaces that di¤er from X. Instead, it may be argued that people are, say, either altruist or not; that
is, they play a large class of games (if not all) with the same preference relation. This idea leads one
to consider preference relations that depend on the outcomes only through the induced distribution
of payo¤s. Such interdependent preferences do not depend on the underlying environment and
include the most standard formulations of altruistic, reciprocal and spiteful preferences (cf. Sethi
and Somanathan, 1999).
The question then is if the instability of individualistic preferences can be obtained in an eco-
nomically interesting class of environments that involve meaningful interdependent preferences. The
answer turns out to be yes. Among others, the recent results due to Koçkesen et al. (1998, 1999)
show that there is a large class of playing-the-…eld type environments in which quite reasonable (in-
terdependent) preference structures can drive individualistic preferences even into extinction. The
following example aims to demonsrate this point.











; ai ¸ 0; i = 1;:::;n;
for some di¤erentiable h : R+ ! R+: The pre-environment ¡ can then be thought of as a situation
in which the entire population interacts through a common-pool resource game in which individual
j receives a share of the total output that is proportional to her share of aggregate extraction e¤ort.
We thus think of xj and
P
xi as the extraction e¤ort exerted by individual j and the aggregate
extraction e¤ort, respectively, and interpret h(
P
xi) as the average return to e¤ort. Accordingly,
we normalize the opportunity cost per unit of extractive e¤ort to 1; and assume that h0 < 0 and
h(0) > 1 > lims!1 h(s): It is clear that these properties of h ensure the existence of a unique ° > 0
such that h(s) ? 1 if, and only if, s 7 °:
w de…ne the function ½ : Rn
+ ! R as





and consider E = (¡;½) as an environment. This particular preference structure is a special instance
of “negatively interdependent preferences,” which re‡ect Duesenberry’s relative income hypothesis.
Hence, unlike the non-individualistic preferences considered in Example 1, we now consider a prefer-
ence relation which belongs to a family that is widely used in many distinct areas of economics. In
particular, our present formulation is nothing but a minor modi…cation of Shubik’s beat-the-average
objective function, the analogues of which occupy a center stage in the theory of strategic delegation
(cf. Vickers (1985) and Fershtman and Judd (1987)).
8We claim that individualistic preferences are exterminated by ½: To prove this claim, we shall
show that, for any population composition t, player 1 must obtain a strictly lower material payo¤
than player n in any equilibrium of the game Gf1;:::;ng(t) ´ (fR+;ujgj=1;:::;n); where uj is de…ned
as in (??) with ¼ and ½ being as speci…ed above. (Of course, in our symmetric framework, this
means that any individualistic player obtains a strictly lower payo¤ than any individual of type ½
at any equilibrium.) Consider any population composition t and an arbitrary x¤ 2 N(Gf1;:::;ng(t)):





¼; if j = 1;:::;r;
½; if j = r +1;:::;n,
for some r 2 f2;:::;n ¡ 1g; that is, we let the …rst r individuals to be individualistic. We shall
…rst establish that minfx¤
1;x¤




i > °: Then, ¼(x¤
j;x¤
¡j) < 0 for all j; and hence it is immediate that x¤
j = 0 must hold
since x¤ is an equilibrium. (In the case of interdependent agents, this follows from the fact that
@½(x¤
n;x¤
¡n)=@xn < 0 whenever
P
x¤
i > °:) This, however, contradicts
P
x¤




i = °; then we must again have x¤
j = 0 for all j = 1;:::;r; for otherwise we would have
¼(x¤
j ¡ ";x¤
¡j) > 0 = ¼(x¤
j;x¤
¡j) for any " 2 (0;x¤
j); which contradicts that x¤ is an equilibrium.
Similarly, x¤
j = 0 must hold for all j = r + 1;:::;n; since if x¤
j > 0 for a player j of type ½; the
…rst order condition for j and the hypothesis that
P
x¤




jh0(°) = 0; which contradicts x¤
j > 0: We may therefore conclude that
P
x¤
i < °. But then, for
any " 2 (0;° ¡
P
x¤
j); we have ¼(";x¤
¡j) > ¼(0;x¤
¡j) for all j = 1;:::;r and ½(";x¤
¡j) > ½(0;x¤
¡j) for
all j = r +1;:::;n. Thus, we must have x¤
j > 0 for all j; the equilibrium x¤ must be an interior one.
Consequently, ¼(x¤
j;x¤
¡j) > 0 for all j:
Given that minfx¤
1;x¤


































must be satis…ed. Since, by de…nition of ¼; @¼(x¤
j;x¤
¡j)=@xn < 0 for all j 6= n and ¼(x¤
j;x¤
¡j) > 0 for
all j; it follows from (??) that @¼(x¤
n;x¤
¡n)=@xn < 0: Combining this with (??), we …nd that x¤
n > x¤
1.




¡1) as we sought. ¥
The example above relies heavily on the hypothesis that all individuals in the society interact
with each other (intragroup selection). A natural question thus concerns the modi…cation of the
9conclusions in the case of subgroup matching scenarios. Indeed, an analysis akin to that of Banerjee
and Weibull (1995) would readily entail that individualistic preferences need not be exterminated
in environments with pairwise matching even though they may have strategic disadvantage against
(interdependent) preferences of the sort considered in Example 2. Nevertheless, our next example
shows that subgroup matching falls short as well of warranting the local stability of individualistic
preferences.
Example 3. In this example we shall use the same pre-environment used in Example 2 except
that here we shall focus on a k-wise random matching scenario. Thus, the pre-environment we shall











; ai ¸ 0; i = 1;:::;k;
for some twice continuously di¤erentiable h : R+ ! R+ with h0 < 0 and h(0) > 1 > lims!1 h(s):
Moreover, here we assume that h00 · 0; which in turn guarantees the strictly submodularity of the
subgroup game: @¼(a)=@a1@ai < 0 for all a 2 Rk
+ and i 6= 1:
Now, for any ® > 0; de…ne the function ½® : Rk
+ ! R as





and consider E® = (¡;½®) as an environment. We claim that there exists an ® such that individualistic
preferences are locally unstable in E®:
To see this, let us …rst note that, there exists an ^ ® > 0 such that we have jN(GA(¼;:::;¼;½®)j = 1
for all A 2 A½® and all ® 2 [0; ^ ®]:7 Consequently, by restricting our attention to small ®’s, we are able
to avoid the equilibrium selection problem. In what follows, we shall show that, when ® is small, an
individualistic player (individual 1, in particular) makes strictly less material payo¤s in equilibrium
than the non-individualistic player n; whether or not he is matched with player n in the same group.









¡n(®)) > ¼(a¤;:::;a¤) (10)
where
fx¤(®)g = N(Gf1;:::;k¡1;ng(¼;:::;¼;½®)) and f(a¤;:::;a¤)g = N(Gf1;:::;kg(¼;:::;¼)):8
7The proof of this claim is routine and is thus omitted.
8Notice that, since Gf1;:::;kg(¼;:::;¼) is a symmetric game and has a unique equilibrium, this equilibrium must be
symmetric.
10Clearly, this will establish that individualistic preferences are locally unstable in E® for small enough
® > 0:
We begin by observing that (??) holds for all ® > 0: The proof of this is identical to that given in
Example 2 for the case n = k and ® = 1; and does not require any submodularity arguments. Here
we shall thus concentrate only on establishing (??). To this end, let B : Rk¡1
+ ! R+ stand for the
best response mapping of an individualistic player. (The single-valuedness of this map is ensured by
the assumptions h0 < 0 and h0 · 0:) We next de…ne the function » : [0;°] ! [0;°] by
»(q) = B(»(q);:::;»(q);q); 0 · q · °:
By using the standard arguments based on the Brouwer’s …xed point theorem and the implicit
function theorem, we can show that » is well-de…ned, and B and » are C1 functions on (0;°): Two
further observations about the function » are in order. First, note that the de…nition of » readily
entails that
(»(q®);:::;»(q®);q®) = x¤(®) whenever q® 2 arg max
q2[0;°]
½®(q;»(q®);:::;»(q®)) (11)
for any ® 2 [0; ^ ®]: Second, we may use again the implicit function theorem to establish that » is a







where the inequality is an immediate consequence of the strict submodularity of ¼: We are now ready
to prove the following
Claim 1. There exists a ¹ q > a¤ such that ¼(q;»(q);:::;»(q)) > ¼(a¤;:::;a¤) for all q 2 (a¤; ¹ q]:









»0(a¤) = (k ¡ 1)a¤h0(ka¤)»0(a¤) > 0
in view of the fact that @¼(a¤;:::;a¤)=@x1 = 0 and »0(a¤) < 0: The claim then readily follows from
the continuity of ª: k
Claim 2. x¤
n(®) > a¤ for all ® 2 [0; ^ ®]:
Proof of Claim 2. Fix any ® 2 [0; ^ ®]: The claim follows from the fact that x¤
1(®) = ¢¢¢ = x¤
k¡1(®)
and (??). k
Now, take any strictly decreasing sequence ®m 2 (0; ^ ®) such that lim®m = 0: Since x¤
n(®m) 2
[0;°] (as is shown in Example 2), there must exist a convergent subsequence of x¤
n(®m); which we
11again denote by x¤
n(®m) for simplicity. Let x¤
n(®m) ! x¤













n) 2 N(Gf1;:::;k¡1;ng(¼;:::;¼;¼)); which in turn implies that x¤
n = »(x¤
n) = a¤:
Therefore, by Claim 2, there must exist an integer M > 0 such that m ¸ M implies that ¹ q ¸
x¤







for all m ¸ M: This proves (??), and hence as noted earlier, completes the proof of the fact that
individualistic preferences are locally unstable in E® for small ®: ¥
The upshot of the above examples is that individualistic preferences do not possess evolutionary
stability properties in arbitrary environments under complete information. In particular, due to their
strategic advantage, negatively interdependent preferences (that preconditions a player to derive
utility from being materially better o¤ than others) appear to invade a monomorphic population
composed only of individualistic agents in many interesting environments.9 In fact, depending on the
environment (e.g. one with pairwise matching), even altruist preferences would constitute successful
mutations as shown by Fershtman and Weiss (1998) and Bester and Güth (1998). Similar results
are reported by Sethi and Somanathan (1999) in the case of reciprocal preferences (of Levine, 1998)
that allow for both altruism and spite.
In view of the preceding discussion, one might be tempted to conclude that, while commonly used
in economic theory, the case for individualistic preferences is hardly compelling from an evolutionary
viewpoint. Yet, in the rest of this paper, we shall argue that it has been the implicit assumption of
complete information that is mostly responsible for the apparent evolutionary weakness of individ-
ualistic preferences. As we presently show, relaxing this assumption may lead us to a very di¤erent
setting in which such preferences do emerge as truly focal.
9This observation parallels the well-known spiteful e¤ect of Hamilton (1970): a …nite monomorphic population
adopting a Nash equilibrium strategy may be vulnerable to invasion by a ‘spiteful’ mutant adopting a strategy that is a
nonoptimal response to the action pro…le of the incumbents, but which reduces the average payo¤ of the incumbents so
greatly that it falls below the payo¤ of the mutant (cf. Rhode and Stegeman 1996, Palomino 1996, and Vega-Redondo,
1997). However, notice that here we are considering the harder problem of preference evolution as opposed to behavior
evolution, and hence attribute a trait like “spite” to preferences as opposed to behavior. Consequently, we assume that
all players behave rationally given their preferences, and then investigate the properties of the equilibria conditional
on the underlying preference distribution.
123 Stability of Individualism under Incomplete Information
The previous analysis demonstrates that individualistic preferences should not be viewed as pre-
eminent from an evolutionary perspective, provided that preferences evolve according to payo¤
monotonic dynamics and the economic environment (within which evolution takes place) displays
complete information. Depending on the structure of the game that is played by subgroups, certain
plausible preference relations may have a de…nitive strategic advantage over individualistic prefer-
ences. One way of thinking about this observation is to interpret a non-individualistic player as
an agent who commits herself in an observable manner to play the game the way some such (gen-
uine) non-individualistic person would play. Observability of this commitment usually guarantees
an advantageous outcome to the committing party. For instance, a player who commits herself to
play “hawk” in the usual hawk-dove game against an individualistic player secures herself the best
outcome, since an individualistic player would rationally play “dove” given that she observes the
commitment of his opponent. But what happens if we dispense with the “observability” assumption
in this scenario? Or, more precisely, what happens if we assume that each player has only incomplete
information about the type of her opponents in the subgroup? This gives rise to a strategic context
where players can no longer tailor their behavior to the type pro…le of the subgroup they happen
to lie in. Hence, each player must choose a “‡at” strategy that, in expected terms, provides her
with maximal payo¤s given her own preferences (individualistic or not) and the strategies chosen by
the opponents. In this section, our aim is to show that this leads individualistic preferences to be
essentially the only type of preferences that enjoy natural selection privileges in a very large class of
environments, provided that the number of subgroups in the population is large enough.
Before introducing formally the incomplete information model that we shall investigate here, we
…rst turn to one of the examples discussed in the previous section, and see how the main conclusion
obtained there fails if we relax the complete information assumption. The following example will
also provide some intuition for the main results of this paper.
Example 4. Consider the setting described in Example 1, and assume again that the population
composition is t = (¼;:::;¼;½): Suppose next that a player cannot exactly identify the type of her
opponent but rather assigns a probability to her opponent being individualistic. One natural way
of choosing the prior beliefs of such a player is by linking them to the population shares of each
type. Thus, let us assume that each player assigns probability (n ¡ 2)=(n ¡ 1) to the event that
her opponent (in the two-person subgroup) has individualistic preferences. On the other hand, the
beliefs of the only ½-type player are of course degenerate on her opponent being a ¼-type.
Given these beliefs, we may model the game played within each subgroup as a Bayesian game in



















Clearly, ¾n can be considered as a Bayes-Nash equilibrium for the subgroup Bayesian game described
above.
In what follows, we assume that the above equilibrium ¾n obtains in all of the subgroups formed
in this environment. Thus, exactly (n ¡ 2) many individualistic players end up with a payo¤ of
¼(¾n(¼);¾n(¼)) in this equilibrium. On the other hand, the material payo¤s of the only ½-type indi-
vidual is ¼(¾n(½);¾n(¼)); while the payo¤s of her single individualistic opponent is ¼(¾n(¼);¾n(½)):
Consequently, there would be good reason to conclude that individualistic preferences are locally












To see that this inequality may well be expected to hold, assume that X is a compact and convex
subset of R; and let ¼ be continuous and strictly quasi-concave in its …rst argument. For the sake
of contradiction, assume that (??) fails for in…nitely many n: Then, by passing to a subsequence of
(¾n(½);¾n(¼)) that converges to a strategy pro…le (¾1(½);¾1(¼)) for which (??) fails, we …nd that
¼(¾1(½);¾1(¼)) ¸ ¼(¾1(¼); ¾1(¼)): But by the closed graph property of the equilibrium corre-
spondence, we must have ¾1(¼) 2 B(¾1(¼)); where B is the best response correspondence. By strict
quasi-concavity, however, this can hold only if ¾1(½) = ¾1(¼): Hence, in any environment where
a ½-type player and a ¼-type player would play the game di¤erently when they assign probability
one to facing a ¼-type, (??) must hold. In any such environment, therefore, we may conclude that
individualistic preferences are locally stable.
Before concluding, let us further illustrate the point by providing aconcrete example with aunique
equilibrium that veri…es (??). Consider the environment ((n;2;[0;1];¼);½) where ¼(a;b) = a(2¡a¡b)
for all a;b 2 [0;1] and ½ is as de…ned in Example 1.10 It is readily veri…ed that (??) holds and
¾n(½) = 1 for all n: In turn, through simple calculus, we …nd ¾n(¼) = (2n ¡ 3)=(3n ¡ 4) which
10The subgroup game is thus a symmetric Cournot duopoly game with a linear demand and cost structure. Given
this interpretation, the ½-type player can be thought of as a manager who will choose the Stackelberg output (due to
his contract, say) irrespective of her opponent’s play.
14converges to 2=3 as n ! 1: By the previous observation, therefore, (??) holds in this setting for all
large enough n:11 ¥
We nowwishto improve upon the observationnoted in the above example by focusing on the global
stability properties of individualistic preferences ina large class of environments. To this end, letus …x
an arbitrary environment E = (¡;½). As noted earlier, given any prevailing population composition
t = (t1;:::;tn) 2 f¼;½gn; the key implicit assumption underlying the complete-information context
studied in Section ?? is that t is common knowledge. As in Example 4, we shall instead explore here
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of individualistic players (and, therefore, of non-individualistic players as well) present in the whole
population. The strategic situation encountered by any individual j placed in a subgroup fi1;:::;ikg






where uj is as de…ned in (??). Here the beliefs of the players are such that a ¼-type player as-
signs probability
n¹(t)¡1
n¡1 to the event that an arbitrary opponent is ¼-type, while a ½-type assigns
probability
n¹(t)
n¡1 to the same event. (Notice again that we are letting individuals to condition their
beliefs on their own types.) In what follows, we shall refer to an environment with this information
structure as an environment under incomplete information.
As in Dekel et al. (1998) and mainly for the sake of notational simplicity, we shall restrict our
attention to a symmetric context where the strategy of player j does not depend on the types of the
individuals gathered with her in the subgroup. Thus, her strategy is given by some function
¾j : f¼;½g £ [0;1] ! X
that speci…es the action chosen ¾j(tj;¹) 2 X depending both on player j’s private information –
her type tj 2 f¼;½g – and the commonly available public information, i.e. the prevailing frequency
of individualistic players. Since we choose to focus on symmetric strategy pro…les, ¾j is in fact
independent of j. Thus, we let ¾j = ¾ for all j = 1;:::;n; and identify the notions of “strategy” and
“strategy pro…le” in what follows.
11In fact, it turns out that (??) holds in this particular example for all n = 4;6;:::; which is veri…ed by routine
calculation. It is important to note, however, that ¼(¾n(½);¾n(¼)) > ¼(¾n(¼);¾n(½)) holds for all n; and hence
intragroup selection favors ¼-type players (as would be expected from Example 1). Yet this e¤ect is overcome in this
example by the e¤ect of intergroup selection which favors the ¼-types, thereby illustrating the combined power of
random matching and incomplete information.
15Given a population composition t; the expected payo¤s earned by an individualistic player when















where hµir stands for the r-fold replica of an object µ for any positive integer r and, by convention,
¦0
r=1(¢) ´ 1: Similarly, the expected payo¤ of a ½-type player when she plays x 2 X and the rest of
















We are now ready to introduce the (symmetric) Bayesian equilibrium concept that will be used
in the present incomplete-information setup.
De…nition 2. Let E = (¡;½) be an environment under incomplete information. A strategy ¾ is
called a Symmetric Bayes-Nash Equilibrium (SBNE) if, for all population compositions t,
¨¼(¾(¼;¹(t));¾;¹(t)) ¸ ¨¼(x;¾;¹(t)) for all x 2 X
and
¨½(¾(½;¹(t));¾;¹(t)) ¸ ¨½(x;¾;¹(t)) for all x 2 X:
If a strategy ¾ is an SBNE for E, then the symmetric pro…le h¾(¢;¹(t))ik is simply a standard
Bayesian equilibrium for the k-person game played by each subgroup, when players are randomly
chosen from a population with an overall composition given by t. Therefore, SBNE is an equilibrium
concept that embodies (symmetric) Bayesian equilibrium behavior under all possible population
compositions. Since we shall provide a global stability analysis below, such a formulation is in the
nature of things.
We next de…ne the notion of global stability that will be invoked in the subsequent analysis.
De…nition 3. Let E = (¡;½) be an environment under incomplete information. Individualistic
preferences ¼ are said to exterminate alternative preferences ½ if, for any SBNE strategy ¾ and


















where A¼ and A½ are de…ned as in (??). If this inequality holds for t = (h¼in¡1;½); we say that
individualistic preferences are locally stable in E.
16The notion of global evolutionary dominance contemplated in this de…nition re‡ects a situation in
which individuals displaying individualistic preferences enjoy a larger material payo¤ than those with
non-individualistic preferences under any population con…guration. In this sense, therefore, the sort
of payo¤ monotonicity displayed here is entirely analogous to that already explained in motivating
De…nition 1.
In the present setting, our goal is to establish that individualistic preferences exterminate es-
sentially any non-individualistic preferences if there is a su¢ciently large number of subgroups in
the society. We shall need a number of structural assumptions in formalizing this claim, which is
obviously in sharp contrast with the examples considered in Section 2. To state these assumptions,
however, we need to endow the action spaces of the environments that we will study with some topo-
logical and linear structure. In what follows, therefore, we shall con…ne our attention to environments
with an action space X that is a compact and convex subset of an arbitrary metrizable topological
vector space.12 Furthermore, we will make use of the following assumptions that are posited on the
primitives of an environment, (n;k;X;¼;½):
Continuity (C). The functions ¼;½ : Xk ! R are continuous.
Strict Concavity (SC). Given any x¡i 2 Xk¡1; the function ¼(¢;x¡i) : X ! R is strictly
concave.
No Trivial Equilibrium (NTE). An SBNE ¾ exists: Moreover, given ¼; ½; and k; there
exists some associated environment E such that ¾(¼;¹(t)) 6= ¾(½;¹(t)) for every SBNE ¾ and some
population composition t.
With the only exception of (NTE), these properties are standard and there is no need to elabo-
rate on them here. (However, we shall consider below a substantial weakening of (SC) that still has
interesting implications.) On the other hand, (NTE) embodies a combination of two distinct postu-
lates. The …rst is technical and tackles the problem of existence of an SBNE in a trivial manner: the
underlying ¼; ½; and k are assumed to be such that an SBNE exists for every associated environment
(i.e. every possible n): Since our interest is presently on the properties of (existing) equilibria, we
view this assumption only little more than a simplifying one. Moreover, it is not di¢cult to provide
conditions on the fundamentals of the problem that would guarantee the existence of an SBNE (see
Remark 1).
The second part of (NTE) is, on the other hand, critical for our main results. It allows us to
12While this is a minor point, we note that the metrizability condition may be replaced here with the weaker property
of …rst countability. Since a compact and …rst countable topological space is sequentially compact, the subsequent
analysis goes through without alteration with this weakening.
17study environments in which individualistic and non-individualistic preferences are behaviorally dis-
tinguishable for at least one population composition and some environment. It must be obvious that
such a postulate is really unexceptionable in that if two preferences are, at equilibrium, fully equiv-
alent in behavioral terms, neither we (as observers) nor any evolutionary system may discriminate
between them.13
We are now ready to prove the …rst main result of this paper.
Theorem 1. Assume (C), (SC) and (NTE). Then, there exists some M > 0 such that, if
n ¸ M; individualistic preferences ¼ exterminate non-individualistic preferences ½ in any incomplete-
information environment E = ((n;k;X;¼);½):
Proof. Consider any ¼; ½; and k that satisfy (C), (SC) and (NTE). Let F¼(x;y;z;¹) and
F½(x;y;z;¹) stand, respectively, for the expected payo¤ of an individualistic and non-individualistic
type when her strategy is x; all (other) individuals of an individualistic type choose y; all (other)
non-individualistic individuals chooses z; and there is prior probability ¹ that a randomly chosen
individual be of an individualistic type. By denoting the r-fold replica of an object µ by hµir for any


























respectively. Here, we adopt the convention that F¼(x;y;z;1) ´ ¼(x;hyik¡1) and F¼(x;y;z;0) ´
¼(x;hzik¡1); with a similar convention applying to F½ as well.
Some useful properties of these functions are established in the next three claims.
Claim 1. The equilibrium correspondence ª : [0;1] ¶ X2 given by
ª(¹) =
½
(y;z) : y 2 arg max
x2X




has a closed graph.
Proof of Claim 1. Even though the proof is routine, we include it for completeness. Consider a
sequence (¹m;ym;zm) in [0;1]£X2 such that limm!1(¹m;ym;zm) = (¹;y;z) and (ym;zm) 2 ª(¹m)
for each m: Fix a 2 X and observe that the latter condition implies that F¼(ym;ym;zm;¹m) ¸
F¼(a;ym;zm;¹m) for all m: So, by continuity of F¼; we have F¼(y;y;z;¹) ¸ F¼(a;y;z;¹): Since a is
arbitrary here, and since the analogous reasoning applies to F½ as well, we obtain (y;z) 2 ª(¹):k
13Analogous caveat is found in Ely and Y¬lankaya (1997).
18Claim 2. For any (¹;y;z) 2 [0;1]£ X2 such that
y 2 argmax
x2X
F¼(x;y;z;¹) and z 2 argmax
x2X
F½(x;y;z;¹); (16)
we have y 6= z:
Proof of Claim 2. Assume that the claim is false, and take a (¹;y;z) that satis…es (??) but
y = z. Then, the common action y = z has to be an optimal response for both individualistic and
non-individualistic types alike, given any population pro…le, as long as everyone else also adopts that
same action. Formally, we …nd that
















































Similarly, we also have















Thus, if we denote by ¹ ¾(¢) a strategy that satis…es
¹ ¾(¼;¹n) = ¹ ¾(½;¹n) = y (¹n = 1=n;:::;1 ¡1=n);
we …nd that y 2 argmaxx2X ¨¼(x;¹ ¾;¹(t)) and y 2 argmaxx2X ¨½(x;¹ ¾;¹(t)) for any population
composition t. Therefore, we conclude that ¹ ¾ is a “trivial” SBNE for E; which contradicts (NTE). k
Claim 3. There exists an " > 0 such that
F¼(y;y;z;¹)¡ F¼(z;y;z;¹) ¸ 3"
for any (¹;y;z) 2 [0;1] £ X2 that satis…es (??).
Proof of Claim 3. De…ne E to be the set of all (¹;y;z) 2 [0;1] £ X2 such that (??) is satis…ed.
The set E is closed by Claim 1. On the other hand, note that by Claim 2, (SC), and the de…nition
of F¼; we must have F¼(y;y;z;¹) > F¼(z;y;z;¹) for all (¹;y;z) 2 E: Thus, if the claim were false,
we could …nd a sequence (¹m;ym;zm) in E such that
lim
m!1(F¼(ym;ym;zm;¹m) ¡F¼(ym;ym;zm;¹m)) = 0: (17)
19Since (¹m;ym;zm) lies in a compact space, it has a convergent subsequence. The limit of this
subsequence, denoted (¹¤;y¤;z¤); must belong to E (because this set is closed). Thus, invoking
Claim 2 again, we may conclude that y¤ 6= z¤: But, by continuity and (??), we must also have
F¼(y¤;y¤;z¤;¹¤) = F¼(z¤;y¤;z¤;¹¤): The latter is possible only if y¤ = z¤ due to (SC), which yields
a contradiction and completes the proof. k
Henceforth, our considerations will be parametric over n (that is a multiple of k). In particular, we
shall denote by ¾n the equilibrium strategy played in environment E = ((n;k;X;¼);½). The existence
of ¾n for any …nite n is ensured by (NTE). Now, consider for each population size n = k;2k;:::; an
arbitrary sequence ¹n in f s
n: s = 1;:::;n¡1g, and denote by yn ´ ¾n(¼;¹n) and zn ´ ¾n(½;¹n) the
equilibrium actions prescribed for either type under each ¹n.
By the compactness of X; we may obtain a convergent subsequence of (¹n;yn;zn), again denoted
by (¹n;yn;zn) for simplicity. Let (¹1;y1;z1) stand for the limit of this subsequence. Then, by a
straightforward adaptation of Claim 1, we know that
y1 2 argmax
x2X
F¼(x;y1;z1;¹1) and z1 2 argmax
x2X
F½(x;y1;z1;¹1): (18)
Furthermore, we may use Claim 3 to assert that there exists some " > 0 such that
F¼(y1;y1;z1;¹1)¡ F¼(z1;y1;z1;¹1) ¸ 3": (19)
Denote next by ~ ©¼(¾n;¹n) and ~ ©½(¾n;¹n) the expected material payo¤s respectively earned by an in-
dividualistic and non-individualistic type when the population size is n; the equilibrium strategy is ¾n
and the frequency of individualistic players is ¹n: Clearly, we have ~ ©¼(¾n;¹n) ´ ¨¼(¾n(¼;¹n);¾n;¹n)
and ~ ©½(¾n;¹n) ´ ¨¼(¾n(½;¹n);¾n;¹n): Therefore, in view of (??) and (??), there must exist an
M > 0 such that, if n ¸ M;
¯
¯ ¯~ ©¼(¾n;¹n) ¡F¼(y1;y1;z1;¹1)
¯
¯ ¯ · " and
¯
¯ ¯~ ©½(¾n;¹n) ¡ F¼(z1;y1;z1;¹1)
¯
¯ ¯ · ":
Hence, by (??), we …nd that ~ ©¼(¾n;¹n) > ~ ©½(¾n;¹n) for all n ¸ M: Since the sequence ¹n was


















at any population composition t, as long as n ¸ M. The proof is thus complete.
Theorem 1 establishes the global evolutionary stability of individualistic preferences in a large
class of environments, provided that the number of subgroups is large and the alternative preferences
½ are not behaviorally indistinguishable from ¼. It is important to note that neither of these two
20requirements can be dispensed with. On the one hand, the obvious need for (NTE) was already dis-
cussed above. The requirement that the population size n be large enough relative to k is also crucial.
Only if n=k is large will there be a signi…cant “matching uncertainty” and the postulated incomplete
information may have genuine “biting power.” Thus, only in this case will type unobservability may
overcome the complete-information e¤ects emphasized in Section ??.
As an extreme illustration of this point, suppose that we were to force k = n; even allowing n
to become arbitrarily large. This is the underlying context of Example 2, the only di¤erence being
that the discussion there was carried out under the assumption of complete information. However,
it is clear that the alternative assumption of incomplete information would leave the conclusions
completely una¤ected in this case because of the symmetry of the game – even if individuals might
be uncertain about the type of each particular player, this is an irrelevant piece of information as
long as the corresponding population frequencies (which are now identical to group frequencies) are
accurately known. Hence, even under incomplete information, one can obtain the extermination of
individualistic preferences in the context of Example 2, in contrast with the conclusion reached by
Theorem 1.
We should note that assumption (SC), as used in Theorem 1, may be thought of as unusually
strong for a game theoretical model. It is then of interest to see how much of Theorem 1 can be
salvaged if (SC) is replaced by the following weaker requirement.
Strict Quasi-Concavity (SQC). Given any x¡i 2 Xk¡1; the function ¼(¢;x¡i) : X ! R is
strictly quasi-concave.
This question is answered by our second main result:
Theorem 2. Assume (C), (SQC) and (NTE). Then, there exists some M > 0 such that, if
n ¸ M; individualistic preferences ¼ are locally stable in any incomplete-information environment
E = ((n;k;X;¼);½):
Proof. The proof is a straightforward modi…cation of the proof of Theorem 1. Observe …rst
that Claim 2 of that proof is valid in the present setting. Claim 3, on the other hand, needs to be
reformulated as follows:
Claim 3¤. There exist an " > 0 and a ¹ ¹ 2 (0;1) such that
F¼(y;y;z;¹)¡ F¼(z;y;z;¹) ¸ 3"
holds for all (¹;y;z) 2 [¹ ¹;1] £X2 that satis…es (??).
Proof of Claim 3¤. Observe that
lim
¹!1
F¼(x;a;b;¹) = ¼(x;haik¡1); x;a;b 2 X:
21Therefore by continuity of F¼ in ¹ and by (SQC), there must exist a ¹ ¹ 2 (0;1) such that F¼(¢ ;a;b;¹)
is strictly quasi-concave on X for all a;b 2 X and all ¹ 2 [¹ ¹;1]: Given this observation, the argument
used in proving Claim 3 of the proof of Theorem 1 applies here without modi…cation to yield the
sought result. k
In view of Claim 3¤; if we let ¹n = 1 ¡ 1=n; n = k;2k;:::; the proof here may be completed by
reproducing the line of argument used for Theorem 1. ¥
Theorem 2 is a local counterpart of Theorem 1. It deals with a larger set of environments than
Theorem 1, but it delivers only local stability of individualistic preferences. (It is, however, less
“local” than it might …rst appear, as explained in Remarks 2 and 3 below.)
Both of our main results underscore the same point: the evolutionary rationale for individual-
istic preferences stands strong in incomplete-information environments if there is a large number
of subgroups involved. Combining this point with our former discussion of Example 3, one arrives
at the summarizing conclusion that, among the factors that underlie the evolutionary stability of
“materialist behavior,” the information structure plays a central role.
We conclude this section with further remarks that elaborate on di¤erent aspects of our analysis.
Remark 1. (Existence of equilibrium) As noted earlier, the assumption of (NTE) is used
in Theorems 1 and 2 to guarantee trivially the existence of an SBNE for the environments under
consideration. We may of course solve the existence problem in a less trivial manner. For instance,
if ½ is concave in the …rst argument and (SC) holds, then it can be shown that an SBNE must
exist. This observation can be used to settle the existence issue that is relevant for Theorem 1. (In
particular, an SBNE exists for the environment described in Example 3 for su¢ciently small ®.) On
the other hand, if ½ is strictly quasi-concave in the …rst argument and (SQC) holds, then again an
SBNE exists, provided that the number of ½-types are less than a …xed number and n is large. This
observation applies directly to the setting covered by Theorem 2.14 ¥
Remark 2. (Multiple mutants) The local stability concept contemplated in De…nition 3 is
based on the premise that mutations occur very infrequently and in an uncorrelated fashion so that
only a single mutant may exist at any given point in time. Theorem 2 is thus silent with respect
to the evolutionary stability of individualistic preferences against not-so-infrequent or correlated
14Both of these claims can be proved by using a suitable …xed point theorem in the standard manner. After all,
as long as we can ensure the quasi-concavity of ¨¼ and ¨½ in the …rst argument, there is no problem with invoking
a standard existence theorem. (Notice that quasi-concavity of ½ and (SQC) are not su¢cient for this since a convex
combination of quasi-concave functions need not be quasi-concave.) Alternatively, one may use more sophisticated
(pure strategy) equilibrium existence theorems that are based on weaker convexity requirements (such as diagonal
quasi-concavity); see, for instance, Baye et al. (1993).
22mutations. Yet, it turns out that individualistic preferences perform successfully against multiple
mutations as well. Consider …rst the possibility that several homogeneous mutants may appear
simultaneously – see Remark 3 for the case of heterogenous mutants. Given any positive integer m;
say that individualistic preferences are m-locally stable in an environment E, if the inequality posited
in De…nition 3 holds for all population compositions that consist of at most m-many mutants. It is
easy to see that we may replace the term “locally stable” with “m-locally stable” for any m (which is
independent of n) without introducing any other modi…cation in Theorem 2.15 Thus, this result does
not really embody a knife-edge conclusion: it convincingly carries the message that individualistic
preferences are in general powerful enough to expel any “relatively small” mutation in a vast set of
environments with incomplete information. ¥
Remark 3. (Multiple non-individualistic types) Concerning mutation, another interesting
issue pertains to the possibility that several kinds of mutants may be in simultaneous co-existence
with the individualistic type. In that case, of course, the approach must be adapted accordingly since
our present framework allows only for dichotomic con…gurations (i.e. individualistic preferences and
one alternative type). However, along the lines explained in Remark 2, it is straightforward to observe
that as long as the total number of (possibly heterogeneous) mutants m remains small relative to n;
no signi…cant changes have to be introduced, either in the modeling of the problem or in the required
arguments.
If several non-individualistic types may be simultaneously present, a more di¢cult issue pertains
to whether one can still obtain the global-dominance conclusion established by Theorem 1. In this re-
spect, a crucial point concerns the extension of (NTE) to that more-than-two-types context. Suppose
that we have a …nite set of possible (non-individualistic) preference types T = f½1;:::;½mg, m ¸ 1:
Then, a frequency distribution may be identi…ed with a vector in the m-dimensional simplex ¢m,
¹ = (¹0;¹1;:::;¹m); where ¹s stands for the frequency of type ½s and ¹0 is that of ¼: A generalization
of (NTE) that is su¢cient for our purposes can be formulated as follows.
(NTE0) An SBNE ¾ exists: Moreover, given k; ¼; any ½s 2 T , and any frequency vector ~ ¹ 2 ¢m;
there exists an associated environment E such that ¾(¼;¹(t)) 6= ¾(½s;¹(t)) for every SBNE ¾ and
some population composition t such that ¹r(t) = ~ ¹r for all 0 6= r 6= s:
Clearly, (NTE0) boils down to (NTE) when there is just one alternative non-individualistic type.
On the other hand, when there is more than one such kind of alternative preferences, (NTE0) simply
requires that, for any non-individualistic type, there must always exist some reassignment of its
15For example, in the proof of an extended Theorem 2, one would simply have to allow for sequences ¹n where
¹n ¸ 1¡ m=n for all n.
23relative frequencies vis a vis the individualistic type where each of them (the individualistic and non-
individualistic types) di¤er in the equilibrium-induced behavior. Under this assumption (together
with (C) and (SC)), it is not di¢cult to see that one can establish a direct “polymorphic” counterpart
of Theorem 1. That is, individualistic preferences still exterminate all non-individualistic types, no
matter how many of them there are and what are their initial frequencies.16 ¥
Remark 4. (Related literature) As noted earlier, there are some recent papers that have
tackled the study of preference evolution along lines similar to those pursued here. Particularly
relevant to the present study are Ely and Y¬lankaya (1997), Güth and Peleg (1997), and Dekel et al.
(1998), which are henceforth referred to as EY, GP, and DEY, respectively. DEY show that, in the
case of continuum populations, if players observe their opponents’ preferences, every evolutionarily
stable pro…le must induce an e¢cient pattern of play in terms of material payo¤s. Instead, if the types
are unobservable, DEY establish that only a situation in which individuals’ preferences are consistent
with material payo¤ maximization may be evolutionarily stable. EY and GP report analogous results
applicable to the case of unobservable types. Apart from certain speci…c modeling details, there are
three important aspects in which the present work di¤ers from these papers. We take up each of
these issues in turn.
(i) The cardinality of the population: In the three papers indicated (as well as in most of the
related literature17), the underlying assumption concerning the population consists of a continuum of
in…nitesimal players (this is explicitly assumed in EY and DEY, and implicitly in GP). However, this
assumption leaves little room for some of the strategically-relevant considerations that are well known
to play a signi…cant role in many evolutionary models, as discussed in detail by Hamilton (1970) and
Scha¤er (1989). For this reason, our present framework involves instead a …nite (but typically large)
population, a feature which allows for the possibility that negatively interdependent preferences (e.g.
“spiteful” or envious) may play a signi…cant role in the analysis. When the population cardinality is
the continuum, this possibility is much curtailed, even if actual play takes place within small (…nite)
groups. For, in this respect, the analysis of continuum models may embody sharp discontinuities
with large-but-…nite population models. Our discussion of Example 3 is a good case in point. No
16Alternatively, one could have considered the following weaker generalization of (NTE):
(NTE
00) An SBNE ¾ exists: Moreover, given k; ¼; and any ½s 2 T , there exists some associated environment E such
that ¾(¼;¹(t)) 6= ¾(½s;¹(t)) for every SBNE ¾ and some population composition t:
However, under this alternative assumption, one cannot exploit the line of argument that established Theorem 1. The
key point here concerns the proof of Claim 2, where it could not be argued that if alternative types choose the same
equilibrium action at some population con…guration, they must also do so everywhere.
17See, for example, the evolutionary explanations of time preference by Rogers (1994), risk aversion by Robson
(1996), or altruism by Bester and Güth (1998).
24matter how large the population is in that context, any single agent displaying spiteful preferences
will see her o¤spring eventually dominate a population originally made of agents with individualistic
preferences.18 However, if we had decided to model directly a large populationthrough the continuum
assumption, no (in…nitesimal) agent would have had any possibility of a¤ecting the population state
and, therefore, if endowed with non-materialist preferences, she would have been unable to survive
in that scenario.
(ii) The range of the stability analysis: To the best of our knowledge, almost every paper in this
literature who has addressed the issue of preference evolution has relied on local stability concepts.19
For instance, while GP and DEY use stability concepts that carry an equilibrium ‡avor (like the
traditional ESS), the paper by EY focuses on a dynamic scenario by invoking the usual notion of
asymptotic stability. In contrast, in the present paper we also identify reasonable conditions under
which one can provide global answers to the problem at hand (see Example 2 and Theorem 1) along
with local answers (Examples 1, 3 and 4, and Theorem 2).
(iii) The matching scenario: Most of the related literature has focused on simple matching
contexts where the population is matched in pairs to play a bilateral game. Here, we have extended
this schematic framework to allow for groups of varying size – including, as a special case, the
scenario in which the entire population is involved in a playing-the-…eld game. Leaving aside its
wider generality, the main advantage of this approach is that it allows us to focus on the relative
group size as a relevant (in fact, key) consideration. Its main role in the analysis is to parametrize
in a transparent manner the degree of “informativeness” allowed by our incomplete-information
framework. A related idea is modeled explicitly in DEY by positing an exogenous probability of
true observation of the opponent’s preferences. Here, we maintain the pure dichotomy between
perfect and imperfect observation (as in EY and GP) but introduce a varying extent of e¤ective
unobservability in terms of relative group size. ¥
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that results pertaining to the evolution of preferences under random
matching are bound to depend crucially on the information content of the postulated strategic
18This means that, in a variety of interesting …nite-population scenarios, the assumption of perfect observability of
preferences need not lead to an e¢cient (or Nash) pattern of behavior in terms of …tness, which is in contrast with
DEY. Thus, our results underscore the fact that population …niteness will generally have important implications on
the issue of preference evolution.
19An exception is the paper by Koçkesen et al. (1999) which, as explained, addresses only a scenario with complete
information.
25interaction. If interaction takes place under perfect observability of preferences, a monomorphic
population composed only of individualistic (sel…sh) agents may well be vulnerable to invasion by
“mutant” preferences that involve traits like spite or altruism. This observation is not at all surprising
and is very much in line with the earlier results established in the literature. Unfortunately, one …nds
that, with complete information, little can be said about stable population compositions in general.
The long-run predictions of the evolutionary dynamics in this case happen to depend very much on
the speci…c details of the strategic environments under consideration.
At the other polar extreme, we have a scenario in which preferences are unobservable. Among
the various ways in which this context could be modeled, we have chosen to posit that individuals are
aware of the overall population frequencies of types but not of those corresponding to the particular
opponents with whom they are matched. This assumption conveniently allows us to analyze the
situation as a standard Bayesian game with common priors. Interestingly, we have found that this
approach yields a sharp limit result which (save for standard technical assumptions) is independent
of the particulars of the games under consideration: individualistic preferences are globally stable in
a vast set of environments, provided there is a large enough number of subgroups in the population.
In our view, the aforementioned result provides a fundamental evolutionary rationale for indi-
vidualistic preferences. However, it is also telling that the presence of incomplete information is not
enough to ensure the stability of individualistic preferences when the size of the population is small
relative to the size of the subgroups. It would thus be a mistake to conclude on the basis of the
present …ndings that evolution favors unequivocally the individualistic preferences. For it turns out
that one needs to know more about the structure of the matching mechanism to identify the pre-
cise implications of evolutionary forces on the selection of preferences. In particular, individualistic
agents need not thrive in situations in which intragroup selection is more powerful than intergroup
selection, even if types are unobservable.
To conclude, let us stress that, while we view the present work as a promising start, it does not
say much about alternative evolutionary scenarios that may also involve incomplete information.
In particular, further development of the theory must include an assessment of how robust is our
analysis to the consideration of environments involving alternative matching processes (such as local
interaction or assortative matching), partial observability of types, and socialization e¤orts of parents
(such as the “imperfect empathy” model), among other issues that we did not consider here.
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